Physiognomy and Phrenology

c. Observation of the relation of self-consciousness to its immediate actuality. Physiognomy and Phrenology. (§309-346)

I'll admit right out that a little part of me died of boredom each time I realized there were another 10 pages about dents in a person's skull during this section so...I may not have caught it all. But here's what I imagine Hegel might have been saying underneath the incredibly long analysis of a forgotten "science":

Hegel rejects "sciences" like palm-reading, etc. just as we would, but he does not reject them for the same reason. We would reject these faux-sciences because they are inaccurate (they do not predict the personality, the future, etc.). We do not believe the lines in the palm to be in any way related to the personality. But Hegel rejects them after defending their ability to be somewhat predictive, after showing how he believes lines in the hand can demonstrate something about the inner self. The reason he rejects these "sciences," it seems to me, is that he thinks his philosophy can do better in predicting or determining truths about the inner world. And he should be claiming this, given that he is saying that we can know about the inner world but is aware of the apparent disconnect of the sciences and the inner world. Though we might scoff now at Hegel giving genuine consideration to things like skull dents and palm lines, I think he would make the same argument for rejecting the more advanced predictive sciences we have today. To disagree with him on this point, then, we must be prepared to give an argument as to why science has better access to the inner world than does philosophy. Though I am not a fan of this section, I can't say I am prepared to offer this profession-defeating argument!

Perception

II. Perception (§111-131)

After the immediate experience of an object in sense-certainty comes perception. Perception understands the sensible properties of an object beyond existence (§111) The seeming paradox of perception is that several properties seem to exist non-exclusively in one object. That is, an object's color and texture each exist in all divisions of the object, yet both can exist separately in other objects and are thus not the one property. Perception is able to conceive of an object as both one (unity) and a conglomeration (many) (§113).

Perception is able to understand that some mistakes about properties are the fault of itself, not of errors in the object (§116). Still, it is not willing to take responsibility for the many-unity paradox (§117). Consciousness re-evaluates the process of perception and understands that the paradox exists and makes sense when understood as a perception of an object whose Truth is then reflected into the subject (§117-123).

*Note: Hegel's view on properties as being coexistent but not dependent might be challenged by our modern understanding of atomic structure, which shows us that properties of objects do in fact arise from one essential structure and thus the white color of salt could be said to be more closely related to the cubical shape of salt than it is to the white color of a sheet. I'd say that if that challenge stands, Hegel's method of the dialectic might be in trouble, but then again, we're still talking about an essential "inner" truth here so...maybe not.