Showing posts with label evil. Show all posts
Showing posts with label evil. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 6, 2008

The Incarnation of God - Hegel's Theology

The Reality of the Incarnation of God (§758-787)

Out of its despair, however, the Spirit is driven to its essense: its knowledge of itself. It knows Spirit, thus it is a believer in Spirit, and recognizes Spirit as a "definite self-consciousness," as a reality, as the divine Self (§758) (critique of Descartes).

The incarnation of the Divine in human form, or Christ, is the obvious and natural revelation of the Absolute Spirit as a divine self. But the individual of Christ is in a way lacking, in a way not universal (as the Spirit revealed in government will). It must dialectically pass into the past (die) in order to synthesize a universal (Holy Spirit) that all of the believing community can participate in (§763-764). Concentrating religious belief on the individual (historical) Christ can stagnate religion (§766).

The dialectics of the Divine and the individual are procedurally the same, and are intertwined. The individual progresses from thought (logic) to material (Nature), then to self-consciousness (Spirit). The Divine progresses from essence (Father) to being-for-self (Logos, Christ), then to "self-knowledge in [the] other" (Holy Spirit) (§770).

Creation and the supposed fall of man is also a natural process, in which the pure thought of God becomes manifest in nature, then becomes an independent thinking Spirit of its own (§773-773). This independence is judged as evil (angelic or human) (§776). Hegel rejects, however, the theological view that evil is the absence of God. Instead, the big picture is that evil is a "distant" part of God (there is nothing outside God), and that in the individual (human/angel), an evil act is the beginning of morality, of self-ness. This understanding of evil characterizes it as disobedience, but not as unnatural, inhuman, or even entirely ungodly.

Disobedience and individual selfhood is our dialetical step "away" from identifying with God, and reconciliation is our step back, and salvation (unity with God) is the synthesis. Hegel explains that the reason believers see salvation as an occurence "something far away in the future" and reconciliation as "away in the distance of the past" is that the spiritual place inhabited by believers is still in the process, it has momentum between the antithesis and the synthesis (§787).

Thursday, April 17, 2008

Conscience, Evil and Its Forgiveness

C. Conscience. The ‘Beautiful Soul’. Evil and its Forgiveness (§632-671)

In withdrawing from the impossible reconciliation of moral duties and Nature, self-consciousness rejects positions that draw contradictions between laws of duty and real action. Instead self-consciousness determines that what it is inwardly sure of must be the truth, the right action (§635). The surety is conscience. Conscience's judgements are individual, but the recognition of conscience as the right is understood by all conscientious persons (§640).

Conscience is a way in which morality can be both individual, non-categorical, but also universal, befitting of the true essence of morality (§638). All of the acts of conscience for the good of the self could be defended as for the good of the universal, but the self is aware that not all consciences will determine them to be so. Therefore conscience, the very manifestation of surety of self, also wrestles with self-doubt (§648). An act must be made by a fully-conscious actor to be beyond the doubt of others. This criterion is so strong that it excludes the criterion of real-world consequences (§651).

Language is the means of relation between all persons, and thus it is the mode of relations between conscientious actors (§652).

Conscience, as the will that is not tied to real-world consequences is essentially empty; it is tempted not to act in the real world at all, to avoid compromising its pure will (§655-657). This is the "beautiful soul" - an uncommitted Spirit (§658).

This Spirit looks down on the active individual and judges it. The active individual is guilty of imperfect action, and is aware of this, but the beautiful soul is in turn guilty of judging without deigning to be involved in the action. Here again we see an opposition or juxtaposition of parts of the self. Hegel claims that this is an appearance of God (§671), but leaves any explanation of this claim to the following section, Religion.