Below are a few objections that have been raised in our off-line discussions that I think ought to be kept in mind:
1. (courtesy of Jon) MacIntyre's argument against the social sciences as they are currently conceived seems to be that (a) they attempt to apply prescriptive generalizations to human behavior, (b) human behavior always has and will have an element of unpredictability (free will, development, surprise, game theory success, etc.), therefore (c) the sciences are wrong to be prescriptive or to give law-like generalizations. MacIntyre also seems to be offering Aristotelian virtue-ethics as a positive and coherent moral/social theory. How does virtue-ethics NOT fall prey to the same argument as above? Virtues are generalizations, at least about what SHOULD happen, concerning human behavior. Does MacIntyre offer a rebuttal later in the book? Is there a possible rebuttal?
2. (courtesy of Meg) Clearly MacIntyre's suggestions about how society should be changed offer a serious obstacle to retaining the conception of individualism that we have today. Are they also, and possibly because of this, serious obstacles to retaining our democratic (egalitarianist) social views? What about democracy itself?
[Off to vacation in the mountains. I look forward to some discussion on these topics when I return!]